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WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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C O N T E N T S

(Information as of noon EST, 1 December 1966)

Far East

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VIETNAM	1
Operation ATTLEBORO has ended after killing 1,100 enemy troops, destroying vast amounts of war materiel and disrupting the Communists' political and military headquarters in War Zone "C." Communist propaganda leaves little doubt that the Viet Cong will re-emphasize guerrilla warfare, with only cautious use of large-scale attacks. The controversial issue of whether military candidates may run for public office has been raised in the Constituent Assembly's discussions of the draft constitution.	
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There is further evidence that Lin Piao's drive to push through a major reorganization of the party has been opposed--effectively so far--by a group in the Politburo Standing Committee determined to preserve the party machinery substantially intact.	

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MOSCOW INTENSIFIES OFFENSIVE AGAINST PEKING

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Soviet leaders may feel that with Peking's fortunes at a low ebb, now is the time to press for a collective sanction, despite the expected opposition of many key parties.

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


EUROPEAN COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE

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The Europeans want a larger share of communications satellite business, the only sector of space investment that promises an early commercial return.

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FRANCO PRESENTS NEW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR SPAIN

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It will not immediately affect the authoritarian nature of the regime but will permit some liberalization after Franco goes.

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DANISH ELECTION AFTERMATH

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Despite his party's substantial losses in the elections last week, Prime Minister Krag has announced that he intends to continue to head a Social Democratic minority government.

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Middle East - Africa

ANTI-EGYPTIAN YEMENIS STILL SPLIT

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Anti-Egyptian Yemenis have so far failed to unite for operations against the Sallal regime and the Egyptians. Meanwhile, the Kuwaitis are becoming discouraged with their efforts to mediate the four-year-old struggle.

THE SITUATION IN JORDAN

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Husayn and his government moved with despatch to put down the demonstrations in Palestinian west Jordan, but there remains an undercurrent of unrest among Palestinians over his policy toward Israel.

PROPOSED ELECTORAL BILL EXCITES GREEK PARLIAMENT

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National Radical Union (ERE) reluctance to pass a simple proportional electoral bill has lead to a threat of resignation from within the Stephanopoulos government. Although the dispute may be papered over, it will have made the government's future more problematical.

REPUBLIC DECLARED IN BURUNDI COUP

18

Although the new regime which deposed King Ntare appears to face no serious internal opposition, the passing of the monarchy removes a major restraint on the sometimes-violent rivalry between the Tutsis and the more numerous Hutus.

Western Hemisphere

OPPOSITION WINS URUGUAYAN ELECTIONS; COUNCIL SCRAPPED

20

Uruguayans elected opposition Colorado Party member Oscar Gestido as president and approved a constitutional reform which sets up a government ruled by a president rather than the present nine-man governing council.

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FAR EAST

VIETNAM

Operation ATTLEBORO, the largest allied search-and-destroy action of the Vietnam war ended on 25 November. The six-week campaign, which at one time included as many as 17 US and two ARVN battalions killed an estimated 1,100 enemy troops and captured or destroyed vast amounts of enemy foodstuffs and war materiel.

Over the long term, perhaps the most significant aspect of Operation ATTLEBORO will be the allies' dramatic demonstration of their ability to commit an overwhelming number of troops quickly to combat in any area without seriously weakening other vital areas. Even the temporary incursion into the Communists' long-time jungle stronghold in Tay Ninh Province probably is a serious psychological and political setback to them as their aura of invincibility was once one of their most potent political weapons.

Guerrilla Warfare Re-emphasized

A Liberation Front broadcast of 13 November left little doubt that the Viet Cong high command has decided to re-emphasize guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam. This theme has been featured in Communist publications for several weeks, but the 13 November broadcast is the most detailed examination of the subject to date.

It implicitly criticized a decision made by the Viet Cong

high command in 1965 to transfer guerrillas to main force units. It further criticized efforts by the Communist leadership in the South to challenge large US units equipped with superior firepower and mobility. It also cited Party First Secretary Le Duan as an authority for the present need to concentrate on guerrilla warfare and to intensify Communist political efforts in the South. This is one of the few times that the Liberation Front has publicly admitted that Le Duan is one of the principal architects of the Communist revolution in South Vietnam.

Heavy losses to Communist main force units in engagements over the past year undoubtedly have convinced the Communists that they should revert to smaller scale guerrilla activity. Such a shift, however, will not end all large-scale Communist attacks in the South. The Viet Cong will undoubtedly continue to launch such attacks when they believe the opportunity presents itself. It does imply, however, that the Communists will be much more cautious in committing their larger units to combat. A significant drop in the average rate of battalion-size attacks has been apparent since July.

The 13 November broadcast made it clear, moreover, that the new attention to guerrilla tactics does not mean that the Communists intend to stand down militarily. The broadcast warned

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that to "pause at the defensive" is to invite annihilation and it pointed out that even in guerilla warfare the objective is to keep the enemy under constant attack.

Hanoi Scuttles Cambodian "Summit"

Sihanouk has reportedly stated that his proposed "summit" meeting with Liberation Front and Hanoi leaders will not take place. Hanoi apparently reacted coolly to the proposal, suggesting that preliminary meetings be held at the foreign ministry level to establish the purpose of the meeting and an agenda.

Constituent Assembly Making Progress

After nearly two months of procedural deliberations, the assembly empowered to draft a new constitution has begun debating the document's fundamental principles. An agenda was adopted on 26 November and in only three sessions, the deputies approved a preliminary bill of rights. Discussions on the rights of citizens reflected the underlying regional and occupational biases of the deputies. A proposal governing the rights of peasants to own their land and bearing on the whole question of

land reform provoked heated arguments.

At its 30 November session the assembly approved a proposal that "military personnel on active duty cannot join political parties or participate in the government." All of the articles adopted may be subject to further modification when the actual draft constitution is debated.

The assembly's action on the issue of military candidates for public office may affect the outcome of its efforts to curb the Directorate's authority to revise the constitution prior to its final adoption. Chief of State Thieu and his colleagues still have under consideration an earlier assembly proposal which would limit the Directorate's amending power. They are expected to reach a decision on this proposal in the next few days.

The assembly also approved four constitutional duties of citizens. It is now scheduled to move on to a floor discussion of the future institutional form of the government. The assembly hopes to wind up its work on the basic constitutional principles by Christmas, leaving nearly three months to hammer out the draft constitution.

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CAMBODIA LESS TOLERANT OF VIET CONG

There are new indications that Cambodia is making at least some effort to limit Viet Cong use of its territory as a source of supply and sanctuary. These efforts suggest that Phnom Penh is re-evaluating its estimate of both the scope of Communist use of Cambodia and the dangers inherent in this situation.

[redacted] the Cambodian Government was "very concerned" over possible Viet Cong incursions resulting from the recent allied Operation ATTLEBORO, in South Vietnam's Tay Ninh Province (see map page 2).

[redacted] reinforced Cambodian border forces turned back a Viet Cong element on 20 November and subsequently refused to allow the Communists to evacuate their wounded into Cambodia.

[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

it was a common occurrence for small numbers of Viet Cong to take refuge in Cambodia during allied ground sweeps or air attacks along the border. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] Cambodian troops engaged the Communists they encountered, but [redacted] 25X1

more extensive measures would be taken to control the border, since the Viet Cong always re-entered South Vietnam when the danger was past. 25X1

[redacted] at 25X1

least some Cambodian border units are not working with the Viet Cong. [redacted] 25X1

Phnom Penh now is translating into practical measures its growing concern over charges that it is actively supporting the Communists in South Vietnam. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

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POLITICAL MANEUVERING IN INDONESIA

General Suharto and his colleagues, although well launched on the transition from the Sukarno era to the "new order," continue to encounter problems of accommodation with Indonesia's diverse political elements.

The civilian front that supported the army's anti-Communist, anti-Sukarno campaign during the past year is well on the way to disintegration. Its elements now run the gamut from those who want more accommodation of Sukarno to those who espouse all-out opposition leading to his eventual removal. The resulting loss of the army's sure parliamentary majority has kept Suharto from pushing some parts of his reform program.

To remedy this situation General Suharto hopes to appoint 110 new members to the present 240-member legislature in the next month. Sukarno initially refused to sign the decree, which authorizes an unspecified number of appointments. He now has signed it, obviously hoping to influence the size and composition of the new contingent.

Some of Suharto's appointees will be youth leaders, who are disappointed with his gradual approach and frustrated at finding their own political role dimin-

ished. Their dissatisfaction focuses on the army's refusal to condone continued demonstrations against Sukarno, and Suharto hopes that putting youth leaders in parliament will divert them from street action.

An abiding problem under the "new order" is the basic distrust between the military and most political parties. The politicians resent army encroachment into the normally civilian sectors of the government. The army distrusts the civilian politicians, feeling that the political leaders have little sense of national purpose and are chiefly interested in maneuvering themselves and their organizations into advantageous positions.

Despite frustrations and inevitable compromises, the Suharto regime continues its moves to reduce Sukarno as a political force. Air Marshal Omar Dani's trial, repeatedly postponed, now is scheduled to begin on 5 December. If Dani talks freely, [redacted]


his testimony will be the most damaging evidence to date on Sukarno's role in the abortive coup of October 1965. [redacted]

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SECRET**THE MILITARY SITUATION IN LAOS**

The end of the rainy season has brought the usual flurry of Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese attacks against government positions in northern Laos, but there is nothing to indicate that the Communists contemplate heavier fighting this year than in recent years. On the contrary, their ability to mount and sustain a significant offensive has been considerably reduced by US and Laotian air strikes on their troop and supply concentrations.

Government positions at Tha Thom and Ban Ta Viang were overrun by a battalion-sized attack on 24 November but government troops counterattacked on 29 November. These positions, which defend Route 4 leading south to the Mekong plain, were lost and regained by government forces earlier this year.

There have been reports that the Communists may attempt to retake other positions in the north, but they probably plan to do nothing more than offset government gains made during the past rainy season. Rice raids can also be expected during the coming harvest to compensate for the effects of US air strikes on the Communists' resupply activities.

The resupply operation usually observed early in the dry season apparently began several weeks ago. From August to early November, about 20 trucks a day entered Laos from North Vietnam over Route 7. During November, the number averaged between 30 and 40 a day.

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DIVISION IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP

The Red Guard rallies staged in Peking on 25 and 26 November did little to clear up questions about Communist China's leadership. On 23 November a printed Red Guard pamphlet made serious charges, verging on treason, against Chief of State Liu Shao-chi and party general secretary Teng Hsiao-ping. It demanded their dismissal from all posts.

Liu and Teng, however, were present with Mao at the 25 November rally as if nothing had happened. Mao shook hands with Liu as well as with other leaders on the reviewing stand. According to the New China News Agency, Liu signed a state message sent to Mauritania on 27 November.

The only significant absentee from the rally was Li Hsueh-feng, who replaced the disgraced Peng Chen as first secretary of the Peking city party committee in May. Li has been under heavy attack in the past two months, through Red Guard posters and demonstrations, but until 25 November he had appeared regularly at Red Guard rallies. He may have been quietly dismissed. If so, he is the only high official to fall in recent weeks.

In a speech at the Albanian Embassy on 29 November, Premier Chou En-lai described the struggle in the past tense, but no other evidence supports this claim. Chou asserted that the "proletarian revolutionary line... has won victory" and that the

"bourgeois line...has been defeated. A People's Daily article on 27 November described the status of the cultural revolution in more standard terms, however. It said that there still remain a "tiny handful" of powerful party leaders to be brought down and others who were "consciously or unconsciously" opposing the cultural revolution to be brought into line.

Information just received strengthens earlier indications that the current leadership has been at loggerheads since the 11th party plenum in early August over the question of bringing down party leaders like Liu and Teng. According to excerpts of a speech made by Lin Piao at the 11th plenum, reported in a Red Guard poster, Lin demanded the "reorganization" of party cadres. "Until this can be done," he said, "we shall not break the situation of stalemate." Asserting that his actions had Mao's full approval Lin said that Mao had delegated considerable authority to him: "I do not interfere with him on major matters, nor do I trouble him on minor matters."

The 23 November Red Guard pamphlet stated that it was repeating charges made against Liu and Teng at the 11th plenum. Evidently the ultraradical faction which brought the charges, presumably led by Lin, was able to make only minor ones stick. Liu and Teng, although demoted in hierarchical rank, have appeared regularly at large turnouts of leaders since the plenum.

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Red Guard factions have been in conflict over Liu at least twice since the 11th plenum. According to a lengthy polemical tract issued by ultraradical Red Guard groups on 7 October, posters had been put up at Tsinghua University on 24 August strongly attacking Liu and demanding his dismissal and the reorganization of the central committee. A force of 2,000 Red Guards from other institutions were promptly sent to Tsinghua to suppress the posters and the group --Red Guards of Maoism--which had put them up. The tract intimates that the suppression was authorized by Chen Po-ta and the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee, and it also paints Chou En-lai in an unfavorable light.

Several times during October posters criticizing Liu reportedly were put up but were promptly removed. There are credible reports that anti-Liu posters were suppressed on the morning of the 18 October rally, resulting in fighting among Red Guards on such a scale that the rally was first canceled and then held in a curtailed form. Elaborate preparations had been made before

18 October for Mao and other leaders to appear on the reviewing stand, but all they did was drive through Tienanmen Square in a motorcade that lasted only half an hour.

It now appears that an ultra-radical faction led by Lin has wanted all along to push through a major reorganization of the party. It has apparently been opposed, effectively so far, by a group in the politburo standing committee determined to preserve the party machinery substantially intact. Mao's role in all this is obscure. He may support Lin's program in general, but be unwilling to condone extreme action against Liu and Teng.

The significance of attempts to bring down Liu and Teng in disgrace is that they had been dominant leaders in the regular party machinery for more than a decade, and thus many party leaders at the center and in the provinces owe their careers to the two. A thorough discrediting of them would give the Lin forces a powerful weapon to use in dismissing, demoting, or intimidating large numbers of party leaders.

EUROPE

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MOSCOW INTENSIFIES OFFENSIVE AGAINST PEKING

Soviet leaders have intensified their attacks on China in an apparent effort to make the Peking regime anathema to the rest of the Communist world.

Early this week, Pravda issued a bitter, detailed indictment of "Mao Tse-tung and his circle." The article set out to prove that Mao's chauvinism, and his determination to turn the Chinese Communist party

into "an obedient, blind weapon to execute his will" have deprived his regime of the right to call itself Communist.

The editorial pointed out that the Chinese leaders now consider the USSR "enemy number one," and that they are also attacking the "overwhelming majority" of world parties.

The Soviets would clearly like to secure a collective endorsement

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of an indictment such as that contained in Pravda, and, in this connection, they are keeping alive the idea of some kind of international Communist gathering. A large-scale, formal party meeting on the order of the Moscow conferences of 1957 and 1960, which would be at least implicitly anti-Chinese, would be desirable from the USSR's point of view. The Russians have approved foreign party assertions that conditions are "ripening" for such a gathering.

The Soviet leaders may feel that, with Peking's fortunes at a low ebb, now is the time to press for a collective sanction of China, despite the expected opposition of many key parties.

At the party congress in Budapest this week, Hungarian party chief Kadar and Brezhnev reiterated approval of the conference idea in the same qualified terms used by Zhivkov and Brezhnev at the Bulgarian party congress two weeks ago. However, Kadar went beyond other recent statements to allow for a conference without all parties in attendance. Moreover, Russian propaganda has become more openly critical of those recalcitrant parties who, "out of fear of offending the splitters, avoid any initiative to solve current problems."

The Russian leaders, however, have no reason to expect smooth sailing, should they press in earnest for a formal, all-

party conference. The continuing reluctance of several key parties to go along with this idea was evident in the generally unenthusiastic reaction to it at the Bulgarian party congress. In order to secure the agreement of eight ruling Communist party leaders to assemble for an innocuous gathering in Moscow last October, the Soviets had to forgo any explicit attempt to exploit that gathering in their offensive against Peking.

In view of this, Moscow has been circumspect in advancing the meeting proposal, and there have been no reliable reports that the Russians are doing any real arm-twisting. The Rumanian ambassador in Moscow recently told his Canadian colleague that a conference was not envisaged "even by the Russians for the near future."

The evidence at hand suggests that Moscow will eventually have to settle for something less than what it may now hope to achieve. The Soviet leaders probably even now suspect this will be the case. In preparing a possible fall-back position, they have been careful to endorse other modes of "collective work" such as more extensive bilateral and regional contacts, as well as a world meeting. In any event, any mammoth conclave --if there is to be one--will probably await a fitting occasion, such as the USSR's 50th anniversary celebrations next year.

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EUROPEAN COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE

The Europeans want a larger share of communications satellite business, now predominantly American and the only sector of space investment that promises an early commercial return. Interest in a regional European satellite system is growing, fed by mounting resentment of US domination of the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT).

The European Conference on Satellite Communications (CETS), meeting in The Hague on 22-24 November, requested the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) to draw up specifications for an experimental satellite for use in a regional European system. The CETS plan recommends that three such satellites be built and that they be orbited by the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO). Although CETS, an advisory group of telecommunications authorities, has no power, its policies generally have the sup-

port of member governments. ESRO will decide next month whether to accept the request.

Some months ago, in an effort to gain the lead in European satellite technology, France completed her own plans for a communications satellite serving Europe and Africa. On 30 November Paris announced plans to orbit two communications satellites by 1970. Because the project would be too costly for the French alone, they recently decided to invite Britain and other European nations to participate. At a meeting with French officials in Bonn in early November, West Germany agreed to support the project providing it would not prove divisive to either ESRO or INTELSAT. The Germans insisted that ESRO build the satellite and asked that it be brought under INTELSAT sponsorship in keeping with the European commitment to a single global INTELSAT system.

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FRANCO PRESENTS NEW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR SPAIN

The long-awaited constitutional reform which General Franco unveiled in a speech to the Cortes on 22 November will make some cautious changes in the political machinery when adopted. The changes will not immediately affect the authoritarian nature of the regime but they will permit some liberalization after Franco goes.

On 14 December a national referendum--the one occasion on which universal suffrage is permitted--is expected to endorse the Cortes' approval of the law. The government has begun a country-wide propaganda campaign to get out a large affirmative vote.

The new law reaffirms much of the 1947 law which declares Spain to be a monarchy and provides machinery for choosing Franco's successor as chief of state. In addition the new law would authorize the chief of state to appoint a premier from among three candidates proposed by the Council of the Realm, an advisory body which also participates in selection of the chief of state. The premier is to serve for five years at the pleasure of the chief of state and may not be removed by the Cortes. He will administer the government and propose other members of his cabinet.

Thus Franco's dual positions as chief of state and chief of government can be separated. Under Franco, a premier would probably have limited responsibility similar to that of the French

premier under President de Gaulle. After Franco goes, however, it is expected that the premiership will be the center of executive power.

The new constitution provides a few measures of political liberalization. About one fifth of the Cortes members are to be chosen by direct vote of "heads of families and married women." The majority, however, will still be chosen indirectly by the municipalities and various corporate groups such as syndicates and professional organizations.

The National Movement, which is the only legal political organization in Spain, has had its role reduced to that of guardian of the nation's ideological principles. Its high council will be transformed into a national council, comparable to an advisory upper house. It loses legal control over the labor syndicates which get a larger representation in the Cortes. The principle of religious liberty for non-Catholics is provided as a legal right.

The chief disappointment for those opposed to the regime was Franco's denunciation of political parties. Nevertheless, Franco's statement--the exclusion of parties does not rule out the "legitimate conflict of opinion"--may present an opening for the opposition to express views within the narrow framework of the National Council and the Cortes.

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DANISH ELECTION AFTERMATH

Denmark's swing to the left in the 22 November general elections has stirred up its normally placid politics. Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag intends, however, to reconstitute a minority government.

Krag's Social Democratic Party (SDP) was the chief loser in the election. It dropped seven of its 76 seats, but it remains the largest party in the 175-member parliament. The extreme leftist Socialist People's Party (SPP) was the principal gainer, increasing its strength from 10 to 20 seats. The position of the four major non-Socialist parties remained relatively unchanged. This bloc has 86 seats in parliament.

Krag last week explored the possibility for forming a coalition with the SPP, but talks broke down because the SSP leader, Aksel Larsen, insisted on drastic cuts in the defense budget and in conscripts' length of service. These demands, as well as Larsen's proposal to prohibit joint military exercises on Danish soil, would further hamstring Denmark's activities in NATO.

There appears to be a considerable area of agreement be-

tween the two parties on domestic issues. Larsen indicated that the SPP will support the Social Democrats' controversial tax reform proposals which in October precipitated the call for elections.

The extent to which the SPP will be able to influence government policy depends on how much difficulty Krag has in trying to put through his program and thus on how much he has to rely on SPP support. On foreign policy and defense matters Krag will continue to depend on the backing of the "bourgeois" parties (non-Socialist).

In order to stem the growth in defections from the Social Democratic left wing to the SPP, Krag may feel compelled to propose more generous social welfare programs as a means of competing with the popular and dynamic image of Larsen and his party. Confronting Krag and other party leaders are the examples set in Norway and Sweden where long-entrenched Socialist parties recently suffered electoral defeats that removed one from power and greatly weakened the other.

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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

ANTI-EGYPTIAN YEMENIS STILL SPLIT

Despite efforts by Yemeni tribal leaders to organize joint royalist-republican tribal reaction to the repressions of the Egyptian-backed regime of President Sallal, military activity is at a low level.

Numerous important republican tribal leaders are reported to have contacted royalist leaders in an attempt to combine for operations against the Sallal regime and the Egyptians, but internal squabbles have so far frustrated any overall organization of anti-Egyptian Yemenis.

Meanwhile, there has been little international progress toward a solution of the four-year struggle and Kuwait is discouraged with its moribund mediation effort. President Azhari of Sudan, now visiting King Faysal, has indicated his readiness to mediate

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
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THE SITUATION IN JORDAN

The turmoil in Jordan has subsided after a week in which King Husayn faced his most serious internal crisis in several years. There remains, however, an undercurrent of unrest among Palestinians over the government's defense policy vis-a-vis Israel.

Demonstrations against Husayn's rule spread to virtually every town in Palestinian west Jordan and approached riot proportions in Jerusalem, Ramallah, Hebron, and Nablus. Some deaths resulted when the army and police forces moved in to restore order. Curfews and tight controls on travel between the towns were imposed, and schools were closed.

The demands of many of the demonstrators indicated that the Egyptian-oriented Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was a strong influence. In many instances crowds called for arming of civilians and for stationing PLO military forces along the Israeli border--PLO proposals that Amman has rejected. PLO headquarters in Cairo has broadcast additional appeals for an uprising against Husayn, and this cry also was voiced by many of the demonstrators in Jordan. The PLO, thus, has switched from a long-term effort to "liberate" Palestine from Israel to agitation for the immediate liberation of Palestinian west Jordan from Husayn's control.

This campaign has been augmented by similar propaganda in Egypt-

tian and Syrian media. The radical Baathist regime in Damascus has called for the formation of a "progressive front" in Jordan to overthrow Husayn by means of a "war of liberation." Egypt's press and radio attacks on Husayn have become more direct during the past week.

Nasir, however, anxious he may be to exploit the King's troubles, probably fears a revolution in Jordan would lead to war with Israel. Nasir's ambivalent attitude was evident in a speech he made on 25 November. "We do not want to exacerbate the tension on the west bank of the Jordan," he said. "This particular line of our political and military confrontation with Israel requires that we fully assess matters."

An Egyptian-Israeli air clash on 29 November underlined Israel's continuing superiority in military actions. The Israelis claim that they shot down two MIG-19s; the Egyptians admit only that one of their MIGs "crashed" while on patrol.

The Israeli Government evidently is concerned about the instability in Jordan ensuing from its 13 November reprisal raid. At least for the time being, Israel may exercise some restraint in retaliating for any new terrorism. The Jordanians have captured a shipment of arms and explosives allegedly sent from Syria to a "Fatah" terrorist depot in Jordan--the first known shipment since 13 November.

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SECRET**PROPOSED ELECTORAL BILL EXCITES GREEK PARLIAMENT**

A dispute over a proposed bill for a simple proportional system for counting the popular vote in the next Greek election is further threatening Prime Minister Stephanopoulos' already shaky grasp on the reins of government.

The National Radical Union (ERE), which reluctantly has provided the bulk of parliamentary support for Stephanopoulos, has now withdrawn its original support of the bill and has proposed an indefinite postponement of parliamentary debate.

Last week a caucus of Stephanopoulos' own Liberal Democratic Center Party reaffirmed its support for the electoral bill, but authorized further talks with leaders of the ERE and Progressive parties. Stephanopoulos is expected to consult with the other party leaders late this week.

Some ERE deputies fear that this proportional system would enhance the electoral possibilities of candidates from small, splinter parties and thus discourage the establishment of a "national front" against the alleged "popular front" of the Papandreous and the crypto-

Communist United Democratic Left. Others fear that passage of any electoral bill now would prematurely excite the political atmosphere and hasten the date of the elections, which are not required by the constitution until 1968.

Coordination Minister Mitsotakis wants immediate consideration of the bill and has demanded that Stephanopoulos resign if ERE continues to oppose debate. He has threatened his own resignation if Stephanopoulos gives in to the ERE proposal to defer debate. Mitsotakis strongly favors the simple proportional system, which would enhance his chances for heading a splinter party of the center-right group, and he is opposed to the formation of any so-called "national front." Mitsotakis, however, may retreat from his adamant position out of fear that even if he resigned the government might not fall and he would then be out in the political cold.

An eventual agreement to postponement of debate may result, but the dispute has served to narrow the chances for continued political compromises on major issues.

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REPUBLIC DECLARED IN BURUNDI COUP

Burundi Army officers, backed by an extremist faction of the Tutsi ruling group, apparently are in control of the Burundi Government after deposing King Ntare and proclaiming a republic.


The officers announced the King's removal while he was in Kinshasa attending the celebration of the first anniversary of the Mobutu take-over in the Congo. Prime Minister and former army commander

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Micombero proclaimed himself president, and set up a "revolutionary council" composed of himself and 12 other Tutsi officers. He named military men as governors of Burundi's eight provinces, apparently to strengthen the army's hold in the rural areas, where there may be considerable sympathy for the deposed King. At present, Micombero and his associates appear to face little opposition.

In what the British ambassador in Bujumbura called "a typical Tutsi intriguing political mess," the 19-year-old King had been at loggerheads with the Micombero group since shortly after the group installed him in place of his father last July. The King was supported by Tutsis who seem to have been less inclined toward harsh treatment of the country's Hutu majority and who were not strongly committed to the re-establishment of relations with Communist China.



The faction around Micombero apparently was ideologically committed to the abolition of the monarchy and has in the past been pro-Peking. At least some of its members, including Attorney General Simbananiye, have been identified with harshly repressive policies toward the Hutu. Endemic clan rivalry within the Tutsi ruling group may also have played a part in the dispute.

The new ruling group shares the general Tutsi fear and distrust of the US, and relations with the US will probably remain chilly. However, inexperience and a reluctance to offend Belgium, Burundi's major aid supplier, will inhibit drastic initiatives in foreign policy, perhaps including even the re-establishment of ties with Peking. Moreover, the new regime will also hesitate to offend important neighbors such as the Congo.

Its attitude toward Burundi's long-standing cross-border dispute with Rwanda is unclear. Members of the new regime, however, have in the past aided Rwandan Tutsi guerrilla forces based in Burundi.

Over the longer run, the country will be less stable with the removal of the King. The throne, which has existed for 300 years, was the object of veneration for Hutu as well as Tutsi, and it thus served to dampen the Tutsi-Hutu rivalry. With the monarchy removed, the Hutu—who constitute a majority of the army's rank and file as well as of the population—now are likely to grow increasingly restive. 25X1

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OPPOSITION WINS URUGUAYAN ELECTIONS; COUNCIL SCRAPPED

On 27 November the Uruguayan electorate approved a constitutional reform plan which changes the system of government to a presidential one from a nine-man governing council. The president-elect is 65-year-old retired General Oscar D. Gestido, a former council member and a member of the opposition Colorado Party, which swept to a decisive victory.

Gestido takes office on 1 March 1967 for a five-year term. He is widely respected as a good administrator and has a reputation for honesty. He and his running mate, vice president elect Jorge Pacheco Areco, represent the moderately conservative wing of the Colorado Party.

Gestido won in alliance with the Colorado Unity Front, a group of opportunistic politicians united mainly for electoral purposes. The well-oiled party machinery efficiently delivered the vote.

Both the Colorado Party and constitutional reform obviously benefited from widespread public dissatisfaction with the continuing economic and political crises which in part have resulted from the ineffective council system of government and in part from mismanagement. The new constitution, in addition to creating a presidency, will facilitate land reform by redistribution, through expropriation if necessary. It eliminates the former formula for bipartisan sharing of the executive boards of autonomous agencies, es-

tablishes a central bank on an effective footing, increases the number of ministries from nine to eleven, and exempts private schools as well as public schools from taxes.

The Communist electoral front, FIDEL, made significant gains, garnering better than six percent of the total vote, or twice its showing in the 1962 elections. Its congressional representation increases from one to two senators--out of a total of 30--and from three to five deputies--out of a total of 99. The Communists therefore could hold an important swing vote because the Blancos and Colorados have divided the legislature fairly evenly. This is especially true since party unity is not the norm in Uruguay.

Gestido's electoral alliance will control less than half of the Colorado congressional total, and within the alliance his own faction is weaker than the Colorado Unity Front.

President-elect Gestido has not yet announced his programs. His new administration will face severe challenges in dealing with a deteriorating economy, continuing Communist-inspired labor agitation, and an expected surge in the cost of living. Unless he is prepared to make some difficult decisions and is able to take many austerity measures, the country may continue to suffer debilitating economic and political crises.

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